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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, I focus on one particular technological development that has 
come to influence religious practice in significant ways – religious broadcasting.  
While computer-mediated communications now garner growing research attention, I 
have chosen to remember the influence of the older technology of broadcasting, for 
its continued influence on myriad lives.  In bringing this focus to bear on another 
major phenomenon, that of transnationalism, I have come to understand how 
religious broadcasting does not contribute in a straightforward, linear fashion to 
perpetuating transnational identities and communities, but instead is implicated in 
the assertion of the national in the face of transnational influences, while 
simultaneously enabling and challenging the transnational.  I am aided in this 
understanding through an examination of a specific analysis of religious 
broadcasting in multireligious, yet secular Singapore, and its impacts on a significant 
Muslim minority which is nevertheless recognized as deserving of special privileges. 
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RELIGION, TECHNOLOGY AND THE TRANSNATIONAL 
 
 The explosion of literatures on globalization and transnationalism has 
focused attention on a variety of global, transnational flows: of people, ideas, images, 
commodities, capital and so forth (see Appadurai, 1990).  The role of technology is 
only sometimes acknowledged as critical to facilitating these global flows and 
insufficiently studied.  Technological developments, including travel technology, and 
old and new media, have enhanced trade, migration, conquest, colonialism, 
missionary work, and more, all of which have facilitated access to information and 
the flow of ideologies.  Within the context of religious practice, technology has 
facilitated the movement of religious individuals and groups over space and across 
boundaries, a phenomenon that dates back a long way, with Catholic missionaries 
and Buddhist monks already travelling across the globe centuries ago when travel 
technologies were less advanced than those today.  This has prompted Rudolph 
(1997:1) to argue that “religious communities are among the oldest of the 
transnationals”.   
 
In recent times, technology has opened up new spaces of religious practice –
or “techno-religious spaces” (Kong, 2001), evident in an enlarged range of cross-
border religious phenomena.  These new spaces of religious practice range from that 
which is basic by 21st century measures, such as radio and television broadcasts to 
more recent revolutionary Internet-based communication.  The former has facilitated 
televangelism, as well as documentaries about religious tenets and practices, "chat" 
shows in which religious gurus offer advice on how to lead religious lives, live 
telecasts of prayers/services/sermons and so forth, all of which can and do reach 
across boundaries in transnational ways.  In the United States, for example, Hoover 
(1988:12) argued a decade and a half ago that  
religious broadcasting [had] moved, over the past decade, from the margins 
of social and religious life to center stage.  Once a feature of late-night and 
small-market Bible Belt radio, religion is now available on television in every 
region of the United States and, increasingly, the world” (see also Schultze, 
1991, and Hadden 1993 for a contrary view).  
 
Cassette and video tapes, and more recently, compact discs, video compact discs and 
digital videos, have also facilitated the distribution of sermons, prayers, religious 
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music, and programmes about a host of religious activities all over the world (Babb 
and Wadley, 1995). 
 
Computer-mediated communication (CMC) has revolutionised 
communication in the last few years.  Through them, too, religious lives have been 
mediated. Such CMC may take various forms: one-to-one asynchronous 
communication e.g. email; many-to-many asynchronous communication e.g. Usenet, 
bulletin boards or mailing lists; synchronous communication on a one-to-one, one-to-
few and one-to-many basis e.g. Internet Relay Chat and chat rooms; and 
synchronous communication where the receiver seeks out information from a 
provider e.g. websites, gopher and FTP (see Kitchin, 1998:12-13, for elaboration of 
these forms).  In religion, there are now bulletin boards, mailing lists and chat rooms 
for discussions of religious matters, and personal and institutional websites which 
communicate religious orientations and intentions.  Religious software programmes 
are also available: Muslims, for example, have electronic Arabic tutorials, an Islamic 
law  database, and an interactive Islamic game Journey to Mecca (see Zaleski, 1997, 
for details of resources available via CMC for various religions).  They can be 
accessed from all over the world as long as there is access to computers.   
 
In academic research, there is now much interest in the internet and how it is 
transforming social roles and relations.  Research on the specific influence of the 
internet on religious life and beliefs is still on the ascendance, and deserves more 
attention.  A great deal more research has been conducted on religious broadcasting, 
reflecting its longer history.  Despite the existence of a significant literature, I 
nevertheless choose to focus on religious broadcasting in this paper, in part because 
there remains more work to be done that does not focus on the Christian West as has 
tended to be, and partly because radio and television still remain more accessible to a 
large segment of the world’s population.  It is important that the power of existing 
technologies does not become backgrounded in academic analyses with the 
excitement of new media.1  This will detract from an understanding of the persistent 
                                                          
1 This is not to downplay the importance of new media in religious life.  A recent report 
highlights the fact that 64% of wired Americans have used the Internet for spiritual or 
religious purposes (http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/toc.asp?Report=119). 
 
 4 
influence of “traditional” media.  Thus, in this paper, I choose to focus my analysis 
on religious broadcasting, using the experience of a minority group (Muslims) in 
multireligious yet secular Singapore as a specific case for analysis.  My objectives are 
twofold.  First, I examine the ways in which policies relating to technology 
(broadcasting) and religion intersect.  Second, I study the quotidian experience of 
religion when mediated by technology, as expressed by Muslim adherents 
themselves.  In particular, I focus on the ways in which the nation, transnation, and 
place are constructed and contested in the process, and argue that religious 
broadcasting policy and practice can simultaneously construct and contest nation, 
transnation and place.  In other words, the notion that “techno-religious spaces” (in 
the form of religious broadcasts) have transborder reach and therefore quite 
inexorably contribute to transnational outcomes is challenged.  Instead, a complex 
simultaneity of nation, transnation and place is evident.   
 
Religious broadcasting 
The literature on religious broadcasting is a large one, covering a range of 
issues: for example, how media depicts religion (Hoover, 2001; Stout and 
Buddenbaum, 2003); how media influences religious practice (Hays et al. 1998); how 
religion uses media, for example for evangelical work (Schement and Stephenson, 
1996; Hoover, 2001; Stout, 2001); and how religion influences media use and 
reception of media content (Buddenbaum and Stout, 1996).  Particularly of interest to 
this paper are two sets of literatures: the first deals with the transnational effects of 
religious broadcasting, and the second examines the recursive relationship between 
religion and media. 
 
 Wood’s (1992:215-21) work reminds us especially of the political transnational 
effects of religious broadcasting when he highlights how U.S. religious broadcasting 
agencies may have taken on the role of secular radio stations in seeking to influence 
the political views and ideological persuasions of audiences beyond the U.S. through 
international broadcast.  At the same time, he argues, religious broadcasting may 
operate as an “overt … instrument for the projection of a culture” (Wood, 1992:220), 
thus becoming a vehicle for cultural imperialism, in addition to its role in purveying 
political ideas and beliefs.  The literature of which Wood’s research forms a part 
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reminds us of the importance of examining transnational impact of religious 
broadcasting, and I will return to this issue in relation to Muslim broadcasting in a 
later section of the paper. 
 
 Another set of literature that is relevant to my analysis is that which examines 
the recursive relationship between religion and media, and which gives agency to the 
audience and producer alike.  This acknowledgement will be familiar to many in 
media and communications studies, but bears repeating here, as it forms a major 
philosophical basis for my subsequent analysis: 
 
… the influence of religion on media or the influence of media on religion is 
best seen as something that is not direct or linear.  Instead, we need to 
understand it as recursive, cyclical, and constructed.  People don’t simply 
‘consume’ media; they experience media images, symbols, and messages as 
part of an ongoing flow of experience in their daily lives.  Specific programs 
and images have less prominence than we often think.  They are consumed 
within the larger frameworks of motivation and meaning-making … Media are 
more of a resource than an influence.  As a resource, they both represent 
religious meaning and, at the same time, constitute religious meaning for 
certain viewers at certain points in time (Hoover, 2001:58-59). 
 
As will be apparent later, my analysis resonates with Hoover’s acknowledgement of 
the dual re-presentational and constitutive role of broadcasting in religious life.  
Thus, I examine the ways in which religious broadcasting re-presents religious 
meaning for Singapore’s Muslim population, reinforcing specific wisdoms about 
Islam, such as its key pan-Islamic teachings.  Beyond that, I analyse the ways in 
which religious broadcasting is implicated in an active process of meaning-making 
on the part of the Muslim population.  Far from being “reliably produced and 
predictably consumed” (Hess, 2001:289), religious broadcasts in fact “provide space 
for the creation of, negotiation with, and even resistance to meaning-making – 
including religious meaning making” (Hess, 2001:289).   It is in this sense that 
religious meaning is constituted via techno-religious spaces.  In the present context, 
these religious meanings are constituted in relation to other meaning systems, 
entangled with the making of nation, transnation and place.   
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 Transnationalism and religion 
 Aside from the literature on religion and technology (and religious 
broadcasting in particular), another literature relevant for present purposes is that 
focused on religious globalization and transnationalism, examining the cultural, 
social and political manifestations of global and transnational processes.   
“Transnationalism” refers to many things.  Vertovec (1999) refers to transnationalism 
as social morphology, type of consciousness, mode of cultural production, avenue of 
capital, site of political engagement, and reconstruction of place or locality.  Common 
to all of these is the recognition of transnationalism as the existence of multiple ties 
and interactions linking people or institutions across national borders.  The ways in 
which religious and transnational phenomena intersect have been examined in the 
following ways. 
 
Scholars studying cultural globalization more generally have pointed to 
cultural homogenization as a consequence, with homogenised commodity 
consumption resulting in a “McWorld” where we eat the same food, listen to the 
same music, watch the same movies, and so on (Winchester, Kong and Dunn, 2003, 
Chapter 3).  In the context of religion, cultural homogenization is translated as a 
homogenization of religious practice, or religious globalization.  This is evident in a 
growing convergence and conformity between different religious traditions (such as 
Christianity and Buddhism) in which particular religious ideals are sought: regular 
congregational rituals, adoption of a sacred day a week, a centrality of scriptures and 
texts, an engagement with secular issues such as human rights, refugees, the 
environment, and so forth.  These trends lend themselves to the development of a 
“global religious civil society” (Nagata, 1999).   
 
 Moving from the cultural to the more specifically social, the literature further 
examines the emergence of transnational religious communities.  Proponents of the 
idea of “transnations” suggest that, with globalization, nation-states have been 
“reconstituted” in such a way that transnational people assert local loyalties but 
share in global values and lifestyles (Marden, 1997:37).  In religious terms, 
globalization has urged the emergence of religious transnationalism, rooted in the 
transnational religious community, best imagined as a religious community 
 7 
constructed across national boundaries.  Some argue that the Islamic “ummah” 
provides a classic example (Abdullah al-Ahsan, 1992).  More targeted studies of the 
transnational religious community have focused on the ways in which globalization 
and increasing migration has led to the growing presence of both highly skilled 
visible minorities and equally visible "underbelly" illegal or low skilled ones in host 
countries, and how religious ties with their home countries and new relationships 
with religious organisations in their host countries for these migrants lead to the 
creation of cross-border religious communities.  The transnational nature of these 
migrants’  religious lives, and the continued relations between home and host-
country institutions which modify religious ideologies, practices and expectations in 
both societies as a consequence have been termed “local-level religious 
transnationalism” (see Levitt, 1998) and deserve much more research attention.  
While important, this however does not constitute the substance of this paper. 
 
 Finally, research on religious transnationalism has focused on political and 
ideological issues.  The reach of transnational religious groups set against the 
mediations of local forces has drawn research attention, as has the question of how 
pan-religious identities and communities conflict with local and national affiliations.  
Haynes (2001), for example, argues that globalization facilitates the growth of 
transnational networks of religious actors which feed off each other’s ideas, aid each 
other with funds, and form bodies whose main priority is to improve the well-being 
of their transnational religious community.  The focus, as in other works, is very 
much on organized transnational religious activism.  Haynes examines whether the 
activities of transnational religious actors undermine state sovereignty, and 
concludes from his case studies that while they help to undermine the hegemony of 
authoritarian governments, this is not equivalent to a more general threat to state 
sovereignty.  Rudolph and Piscatori’s (1997) oft-cited Transnational Religion and 
Fading States similarly focuses on the question of state sovereignty and whether it is 
diminished by religious movements that operate across state boundaries.  They 
argue that future conflicts are less likely to result from a "clash of civilizations", but to 
originate at micro levels.  Conflicts are as likely to arise between states sharing a 
religion as between those divided by it and more likely to arise within rather than 
across state boundaries. Rather than seeing transnational religion purely as acting 
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against states, the essays in Rudolph and Piscatori (1997) discuss the dual potential of 
religious movements as sources of peace and security as well as of violent conflict. 
To sum up, the various literatures suggest that there is scholarly interest in a 
range of questions pertaining to religious broadcasting and cross-border religious 
phenomena, including issues of ‘nation’ and ‘transnation’ in the face of enhanced 
global flows of people, images and ideas.  Much of the literature has focused on the 
Christian West, and the limited literature on religious broadcasting and religious 
transnationalism as it pertains to non-Christians (in particular, Muslims) beyond the 
west suggests that further scrutiny is in order to refine conceptualizations and 
expand theoretical ideas about these religious phenomena.  There is, however, no 
“ascent” to theory without “descent” to case, to which I turn below.  To enable the 
study, research entailed two parts.  First, a thorough examination of state policies 
pertaining to religious broadcasting in Singapore, and a specific analysis of how 
these policies are translated into actual empirical occurrences of religious 
broadcasting (or lack thereof), coupled by an interpretation of the ideological intents 
motivating policy and practice.  Second, an analysis of how Muslims in Singapore 
respond to these policies and practices, and how they accept or challenge the 
ideological underpinnings of religious broadcasting policy, reflecting their 
constructions of religion and its place in state and nation.   In this regard, interviews 
were conducted with 45 Singaporean male and female Muslims in a range of age 
groups between 2000 and 2002.  These interviewees were drawn from a variety of 
contexts: from randomly selected secular schools, universities and madrasahs (Islamic 
schools), and mosques, workplaces, and public spaces.2  I turn now to religious 
broadcasting and Muslims in Singapore. 
 
 
ENABLING THE HEGEMONIC NATION 
 
 One of the lessons drawn from observing the three-way relationship between 
‘nation’, religion and technology in Singapore is that the hegemonic ‘nation’, as 
constructed by the state and its apparatus, is enabled via, inter alia, policies and 
discourses about religion and technology.  I begin by focusing on the nature of this 
state-vaunted ‘nation’: a ‘multireligious’ and ‘multicultural’ society within a secular 
                                                          
2 This study was part of a larger research project on the use of secular spaces for religious purposes, 
and this entailed interviews at schools, museums, and public housing estates. 
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framework.  I will then examine how this construct of the ‘nation’ is enabled and 
maintained.   
The secular, yet multireligious nation seems a contradiction, but may be 
understood as follows.  Singapore is secular to the extent that no one religion is 
identified as the official state religion.  Further, a key tenet of the state’s secular 
policy is the view that religion and politics must be kept strictly separate. Religious 
groups should not venture into politics and political parties should not use religious 
sentiments to gather popular support. If members of religious groups are to 
participate in the democratic political process, they must do so as individuals or as 
members of political parties and not as leaders of religious groups.  The Maintenance 
of Religious Harmony Act, passed in November 1990, is designed to define 
behaviour that is acceptable, and allows the relevant minister to issue prohibition 
orders should any individual cause feelings of enmity or hatred between different 
religious groups; should a person carry out political activities for promoting a 
political cause or the cause of any political party under the guise of religion or 
propagating religious activity; should a person carry out subversive activities under 
the guise of propagation of religion; and should a person instigate and provoke 
feelings of disloyalty or hatred against the President or the government.  
 
Even while the secular framework is clearly established, Singapore society is 
also multireligious in that it is characterised by a high degree of religious 
heterogeneity, with the population comprising Buddhists (42.5 %), Taoists (8.5%), 
Christians (14.6%), Muslims (14.9%), and Hindus (4.0%). In addition, 0.7% of the 
population adhere to other religions, and 14.8% have no religion (Census 2000 
Advanced Data Release).  Freedom of worship is also constitutionally enshrined, 
providing the framework for multiple religions to exist.  Specifically, every person 
has the right to profess and practise his or her religion and to propagate it. Every 
religious group has the right to manage its own religious affairs, to establish and 
maintain institutions for religious or charitable purposes, and to acquire and own 
property and to hold and administer it in accordance with law. Every religious group 
also has the right to establish and maintain institutions for the education of children 
and to provide instruction in its own religion, but there must be no discrimination on 
the grounds of religion only, in any law relating to such institutions or in the 
administration of any such law. 
 10 
 
At the same time, the state is also committed to the principle of 
multiculturalism.3  This is enshrined in the Constitution in two ways. First, a general 
clause protects the fundamental rights of the individual and citizen and prohibits 
discrimination by race, language, or religion (Article 12). Second, the Presidential 
Council for Minority Rights established under Article 69 has the general function of 
considering and reporting on matters, referred by parliament or the government, 
affecting persons of any racial or religious community in Singapore.   
 
The secular position, coupled with the specific stance of multiculturalism and 
multireligiosity together constitute a specified Singapore ‘nation’ as envisaged by the 
state.  The singular deviation from this carefully cultivated hegemonic ‘nation’ is the 
special position accorded the Malays, and, relatedly, the Muslims in Singapore.4 
Article 152 of the Constitution focuses on minorities and, in particular, on Malays.  It 
spells out clearly that the government must care for the interests of the racial and 
religious minorities in Singapore; particularly, it must “recognise the special position 
of the Malays, who are the indigenous people of Singapore, and accordingly it shall 
be the responsibility of the Government to protect, safeguard, support, foster and 
promote their political, educational, religious, economic, social and cultural interests 
and the Malay language” (Constitution, 1985: 73).  This consideration for the Malays 
is a legacy of the politics of the 1950s. Specifically, in the negotiations for the coalition 
government of 1959, one of the agreed conditions was that the Malays, as the 
indigenous population, should have special rights, which would be enshrined in the 
Constitution. It could also be an acknowledgement of geopolitical realities; that is, of 
Singapore’s position in Southeast Asia, a predominantly Malay world. Recognition 
that the Malays are the indigenous population and according them a special position 
                                                          
3 Various versions of this concept have been discussed by sociologists. For example, Benjamin 
(1976:115) discussed the concept of ‘multiracialism’ in the context of Singapore as the 
“ideology that accords equal status to the cultures and ethnic identities of the various ‘races 
that are regarded as comprising the population of a plural society”. Siddique (1989:565) 
discussed the “4Ms”: multiracialism, multilingualism, multiculturalism, and multireligiosity. 
To her, multireligiosity “acknowledges a societal situation in which a number of religions are 
practised, but none is officially recognized as paramount”. It is distinguished by a “religious 
populism supportive of moral order”. 
 
4 99.6% of Singapore's Malay population (aged 15 years and over) is Muslim (Singapore 
Census of Population 2000, Advance Data Release No.2 - Religion). 
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could help to avert any suspicions on the part of Singapore’s neighbours that it is 
trying to be a “Third China” (Chua, 1983:38), after mainland China and Taiwan, with 
any accompanying hint of Chinese domination.  In brief therefore, the hegemonic 
version of the ‘nation ‘ as constructed via state policy and practice is one that is 
secular, yet multireligious and multicultural, while privileging the Malay/Muslim 
population in specific areas. 
 
 In what follows, I will highlight how specific policies pertaining to religion 
and broadcasting reinforce the state-vaunted ‘nation’.  While it is fashionable and 
reasonable to argue that ‘techno-religious spaces’ (Kong, 2001) contribute to the 
(re)production of transnational religious identities, it is important to remember that 
they can also simultaneously reinforce the ‘nation’ rather than defy it.  In the specific 
case at hand, the state-vaunted version of the ‘nation’ outlined above is enabled and 
reinforced via a range of statutory regulations and censorship guidelines, which 
simultaneously define and circumscribe the place of religion in the public sphere.  
The following discussions, which use radio and television broadcasting as examples, 
indicate how the enabling of the hegemonic ‘nation’ occurs. 
 
Radio and television are so much a part of contemporary quotidian lives that 
it is easy to forget how they formed part of a technological revolution not so long 
ago.  Yet, it is precisely their everyday taken-for-grantedness that deserves particular 
scrutiny, for the influence that they can potentially exert on the community.  In 
Singapore, radio and television reach almost all homes, providing entertainment, 
information and education.  Because of their potential impact, broadcasting services 
are licensable,5 and subject to statutory regulation and scrutiny by the Media 
Development Authority (MDA), which draws up and enforces a code of practice for 
broadcasting services, and constitutes advisory, censorship review and appeals 
committees to guide programming.  From the broadest statutes to the detailed codes 
of conduct, and from the standing advisory committees to the ad hoc review 
                                                          
5 These licensable broadcasting services are: free-to-air nationwide television and radio 
services; free-to-air localised television and radio services; free-to-air international television 
and radio services; subscription nationwide television and radio services; subscription 
localised television and radio services; subscription international television and radio 
services; special interest television and radio services; audiotext services; videotext services; 
teletext services; video-on-demand services; broadcast data services; and computer on-line 
services (Broadcasting Act, Chapter 28). 
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committees,6 the issue of religion (and race) is subject to scrutiny and regulation, 
collectively designed to maintain the carefully tended secular yet multireligious 
‘nation’. 
 
The contradictions of this secular yet multireligious ‘nation’ are evident in the 
handling of ‘broadcasting spaces’.  Although multireligiosity is interpreted 
constitutionally as the freedom to propagate one’s religion, radio and television 
programming codes stipulate that programming must not “persuade or influence 
viewers towards a specific religious end” (see, for example, 
http://www.mda.gov.sg/medium/radio/r_progguide.html).   At the same time, 
while religion is not explicitly prohibited, there are clear out-of-bound markers.  The 
common thread in programming and advertising codes emphasises the need for 
broadcasters to “exercise due caution when featuring the views, beliefs, practices or 
activities of racial and religious groups”, reminding broadcasters that “matters 
pertaining to race and religion are sensitive and capable of evoking strong passions 
and emotions” (http://www.mda.gov.sg/medium/radio/r_progguide.html).  
Programmes that denigrate, are likely to offend the sensitivities of any racial or 
religious group, are intended to incite or which have the potential to incite racial 
and/or religious intolerance or misunderstanding, should not be broadcast.  
References to race and religion are to be presented “accurately and in a dignified 
manner”.  Further, programmes that “feature the views or beliefs of any religion 
must be acceptable to the target audience”.  Racial and religious stereotyping are to 
be avoided.  Failure to observe these codes will subject broadcasters to fines.  
 
Through circumscribing the discursive field, programming codes such as the 
above define (by exclusion) particular constructions of the Singapore ‘nation’. For 
example, the idea of multireligiosity as the freedom of all religious groups to 
propagate its religion in all medium and contexts is here excluded.  Instead, 
programming codes contribute to the construction of the ‘nation’ by prescribing 
possibilities.  Specifically, they stipulate that programmes must uphold racial and 
                                                          
6 The relevant policies and guidelines are encapsulated in the Broadcasting Act (Chapter 28), 
the Radio Programme and Advertising Code, and the TV Programme, Advertising and 
Sponsorship Code, and shaped or effected by the various advisory and appeals bodies for 
radio and TV programmes, and the Censorship Review Committee. 
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religious harmony; observe societal and moral standards; and promote positive 
family values (http://www.mda.gov.sg/medium/tv/t_progguides.html).  These 
prescriptions dovetail with other state instruments that have been devised to 
manufacture the Singapore ‘nation’, such as the “Shared Values” project of the 1990s, 
in which the guiding principles for the ongoing governance of the country were 
articulated as nation before community and society before self; family as the basic 
unit of society; regard and community support for the individual; consensus instead 
of contention; and racial and religious harmony.  Specific regulations pertaining to 
religion in broadcasting spaces thus reinforce other hegemonic projects of the state in 
maintaining the ‘nation’. 
 
The outcome of circumscribing the discursive space is an absence of free-to-
air religious broadcasts on local television, and very limited free-to-air religious radio 
broadcasts.  In particular, the only religious television broadcasts are from Malaysia, 
on RTM1, 2 and 3, and none on local Singapore channels.  As for radio, there are two 
main programmes on the local channel Radio Warna at 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. daily.  The 
former (Firman Dan Sabda or The Words of God and the Prophet) caters to Muslims 
who engage in their morning prayers, and airs sermons on what it is to be a good 
Muslim and how Islam is relevant to life in modern times.  The latter is a prelude to 
the evening prayer, and comprises similar sermons.  The channel also plays the azan 
(the call to prayer five times a day).   
 
The general absence of religious broadcasts may be interpreted as the work of 
a secular ideology, and its near-absence across all religions reflective of a stance of 
multiculturalism and multireligiosity, interpreted as equality of treatment, and in 
this case, construed specifically to mean equal absence (as opposed to equal space for 
and celebration of all religions).  At the same time, the exception in the form of 
limited Radio Warna programmes and the broadcast of the azan on radio must be 
understood within the context of the special position of the Malays, and, relatedly, of 
the Muslims in Singapore, where the religious interests of the Malay population are 
safeguarded constitutionally.  At the same time, Radio Warna’s religious role in 
facilitating the azan may in fact be read as a means of maintaining a specific 
construction of multireligiosity, one in which religious practices of one group do not 
inconvenience other groups, despite close co-existence.  It entails the maintenance of 
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a religious practice in a minimally intrusive manner for the multireligious 
population, and represents a solution designed to avoid conflict in a multireligious 
society.  In particular, the traditional call to prayer in rural settings and small Muslim 
communities used to be done on a loudspeaker, outward from a mosque to attract 
adherents to prayer time.  In Singapore, population growth and urbanisation has 
meant that the new urban social setup has caused such sound production to 
sometimes be regarded as intrusive by those not involved in that religion or those 
particular events (Lee, 1999).  State regulations were therefore introduced to deal 
with this, specifically, regulations on “noise pollution”, including turning the 
loudspeakers inwards towards the mosque rather than outwards.  This, however, 
caused unhappiness among the Muslim community who viewed the regulations as 
attempts to restrict the freedom of worship among Muslims.  State strategies to deal 
with this included flagging its “multicultural” stance, that all communities were 
affected by the noise regulations, including Chinese operas, funeral processions, 
church bells, music during weddings, record shops and places of entertainment.  
Even state-endorsed and state-encouraged nation-building activities were not 
spared, it declared, such as the recitation of pledges in schools.  To ensure that the 
Muslim community had the means by which to still issue the azan in an effective 
manner, it was agreed that prayer calls would be made via radio.  Thus, Radio 
Warna gained the role of issuing the azan.  In short, technology in the form of a 
broadcast service was called into play to enable (and modify) a particular religious 
practice, thus maintaining a hegemonic version of the ‘nation’ as essentially secular 
and uniquely ‘multireligious’. 
 
The hegemonic vision behind the general absence of religious broadcasting in 
Singapore and Radio Warna’s limited role prompts varied reactions amongst the 
Muslim population.  One view may be summarised as acceptance of the hegemonic 
position: common broadcasting spaces should remain free of religion and thus 
maintain neutrality, reflecting the secularity of the state.  In fact, it goes further, 
arguing that special treatment of the Malays/Muslims should not be accorded.  
Thus, for example, Aini, a 28-year-old Muslim clerical officer, reflects the partial 
success of the state’s hegemony when she says:  
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We are a multireligious society so we cannot have all kinds of religious 
programmes on radio or TV.  If not, there may be conflicts as a result.  Also, 
we are not a Muslim country, so we should not expect Muslim broadcasts if 
the other religions do not have it. 
 
The example is particularly interesting, for Aini’s oxymoronic opening statement 
reveals the ideological contradictions in state constructions of the Singapore ‘nation’, 
and the success at hegemonic influence, despite the inconsistent logic.  First, 
analytically, the general absence of religious broadcasting in Singapore reflects the 
desire to keep Singapore a secular state rather than a multireligious one, for one 
might argue that broadcast space would be given to all religions in a multireligious 
nation.   Yet, ideologically, the state also propounds this multireligious status for the 
‘nation’, and it is that which Aini attributes as the reason for the absence of religion 
in radio and television broadcasts.  At the same time, the general notion of 
multireligiosity as equality of treatment for all religions is clearly accepted, to the 
extent that special treatment of the Malays/Muslims is deemed unnecessary, even by 
a Malay Muslim. 
 
Not all Muslim interviewees, however, agree that equal absence amounts to 
multireligious practice.  Indeed, a further slippage between hegemonic intentions 
and alternative ideological positions is evident in the desire to see “more religion on 
television” (Kamariah, 40-year-old).  This view is expressed by various Muslim 
interviewees who verbalized their disapprobation that the Malay TV channel Suria 
focused too much “on the younger generation” and not sufficiently on the spiritual 
aspects of life.  Twenty-two year old undergraduate Sa’adah, herself a member of 
that generation, described the channel as “very MTV like”, and suggested that it did 
not have much credibility for some in the Malay-Muslim population as a 
consequence.  Comparisons were drawn with Malaysian channels which have 
frequent and regular religious programmes, a practice heralded as desired, and 
viewed as contributing to a “more spiritually enriched nation” (Ahmed, a 25-year-
old graduate).  Indeed, Ahmed was at pains to point out that his desire to have 
“more religion on television” was not confined to Muslim programmes only, and 
argued that he would have liked to learn about other religions through 
“infotainment programmes, if only they were available”.  This, he reasoned, would 
allow better understanding of different religions to develop.  Alternative 
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constructions of multireligious practice are thus evident among the Muslims I 
interviewed, evidence of multivocality as against a preferred seamlessness and 
solidarity of state ideology. 
 
 The complexity of nation-building projects is an empirical phenomenon 
experienced in multiple ways throughout (especially) the postcolonial world.  
Singapore is not alone in this regard.  Where ‘nation’-building efforts are troubled by 
issues of religious pluralism and mired further by potential state-religion tensions, 
the situation calls for skilful ideological work and multiple reinforcing policies.  
Using the examples of radio and television broadcasting in Singapore, it is apparent 
how policies and regulatory frameworks pertaining to religion and technology are 
harnessed to construct, maintain and enable state-vaunted versions of the ‘nation’, 
and work in tandem with other state ideological instruments, such as the Shared 
Values project.  Muslims in Singapore are not monolithic in their engagement with 
ideology and practice, and simultaneously reflect and refract the hegemony of the 
state.  While some appear to accept even the contradictory constructions of 
‘multireligious nation’, others question the contradiction, particularly prompted by 
the ability to make comparisons across national boundaries. With appropriate 
technological wherewithal and suitable regulatory broadcasting frameworks, 
Muslims in Singapore can access radio and TV broadcasts from Malaysia, including 
religious programmes, and this opens up possibilities for alternative constructions of 
the ‘nation’, informed by ideology and praxis elsewhere.   To that extent, hegemonic 
versions of secular state and multireligious society are sometimes challenged. 
 
ENABLING OR CHALLENGING TRANSNATIONAL RELIGIOUS IDENTITY 
AND COMMUNITY? 
 
If the hegemonic ‘nation’ is periodically challenged, what alternative 
constructions fill the breach?  The literature on technology and community earlier 
draws attention to the emergence of disembedded social systems and the rise of 
communities that are not bound by space.  Within the context of religion, this 
translates into the development of transnational religious identities and communities 
that defy national boundaries, facilitated by technology.  Such a community is an 
“imagined” one in which the “image of their communion” (Anderson, 1983:15) 
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across boundaries is rooted in religious communion, not primordial ethnic ties, 
which others like Anthony Smith (1987) premised their theses on.  I will explore in 
this section how religious broadcasting contributes to the construction of a 
transnational religious community, but also to its fracturing.  In particular, I will 
examine how both religious content/message and religious experience may be 
produced and consumed in ways that both enable and challenge transnational 
religious identity and community. 
 
As apparent in the previous section, the regulation of religious content and 
discourse via broadcast is state-based.  To that extent, the control is local, as is the 
specific encounter with a religious message, discussion, or act purveyed via these 
spaces of technology.  Such an encounter could take the form of watching TV in one’s 
living room, or listening to the radio in one’s bedroom.  The local and located event, 
however, evokes experiences that are simultaneously global and local.  In this 
section, I will focus on how this global-local nexus is apparent in the simultaneity in 
which community and identity are experienced.   
 
Broadcasts are global and local simultaneously.  Those programmes that 
purvey the teachings of Islam are viewed as global in nature.  For example, Sutinah 
(30-year-old nurse) highlighted how “most of the topics discussed are relevant and 
cut across national boundaries”, a view echoed by 25-year-old undergraduate 
Mohammed, who identifies the key recurring themes to be “the purpose of creation”, 
and “the unity of Muslim brotherhood” which are “relevant to everyone [i.e. all 
Muslims]”.  Sahlan (60, retiree) elaborates that the commonalities lie in “principles 
from the Quran and Hadis”, and these “do not vary across artificial political 
boundaries”.  Abu Bakar (33, teacher) cites a specific example:  
 
For example, the concept of prohibition of interest. We are living in a secular 
economy. Interest is part and parcel of the economy. We live within the 
economic system which we cannot break. But in religious terms, interest is 
haram [that is, prohibited].  And this concept is applied whichever country 
we are talking about.  In these various ways, the global, transnational 
message of Islam is emphasised, and the specific production location of 
broadcasts is not important. 
 
Yet, many of these programmes are simultaneously local in that they also address 
some specifically local issues.  In all the examples cited, Muslim interviewees in 
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Singapore pointed to the injection of political commentaries in Malaysian religious 
programmes.  As Mohammed highlighted, “they are mainly pro-Anwar”7 
commentaries.  At the same time, discussions are focused on particular social 
problems in broadcast production locations.  Thus, in 2000 and 2001 when the bulk 
of the empirical work for this study was conducted, interviewees pointed to the 
discussion on Malaysian channels of a particular social phenomenon in Malaysia – 
“the bohsiah girls”.8  As Rosnita (30, clerical officer) pointed out, “this is more an issue 
in Malaysia than in Singapore.  It’s not quite our problem.  Our problem is different.  
But it’s interesting to hear.”  What these examples illustrate is that religious teachings 
and beliefs are used to frame commentaries on local social and political issues, 
and/or aspects of these local social and political issues are used to underscore 
religious positions. 
 
Whether we focus on the global or local nature of the broadcast messages, the 
effect is an ongoing construction and contestation of multiple Islamic identities.  In 
the first instance, the constructed Islamic identity is a global one in that listeners and 
viewers are reminded of shared beliefs and a common identity.  In the second 
instance, the Islamic identity is a local one, tied up with specific social and political 
experiences in particular contexts.  It underscores the view that religion is relevant to 
and requires understanding specifically within the context in which it is lived and 
practised.  In other words, there should be no a priori category called “Islam” or 
“Muslim”, but all “Islams” and “Muslims” are to be understood within the 
specificity of social, economic and political conditions.  This reflects Williams’ 
(1977:80-1) argument that analytic categories (such as class and religion) should be a 
matter for historical and place-specific analysis rather than the substantive categories 
that they often assume in social science analysis.  Muslims may share beliefs and values 
in a transnational way, but their experience of Islam is also mediated through the 
particularities of place and the specificities of history.  Being “Muslim” is not a constant 
heuristic despite common transnational beliefs and value systems.  Thus, religious 
programmes made in Malaysia (and broadcast in Singapore) are also embedded in the 
                                                          
7 Anwar Ibrahim was Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia until 1998 when he was charged on five 
counts of corruption and “unnatural sex”.   
 
8 “Bohsiah girls” is a term used in late 1990s Malaysia to refer to female youths and their wanton 
lifestyles. 
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specific Malaysian context of production, speaking to the social challenges of that 
society.  To that extent, technology both enables and limits the development of pan-
Islamic, transnational identities.  It enables through the reinforcement of shared 
teachings, but limits by insistently reminding that religious value is specific to 
interpretation and practice within particular societies.  In effect, technology contributes 
to the fracturing of pan-Islamic identity and community even as it simultaneously aids 
in its construction.  Despite the promise and potential of transnational reach, technology 
in the form of religious broadcasts is circumscribed in effect, first, through the 
regulatory constraints that states impose on access and content, and second, through 
the local specificities that shape production. 
 
 As in production, in the consumption of religious broadcasts, the global and 
transnational, pan-Islamic message is similarly challenged.  Evidence suggests that 
fractures emerge between those Muslims who seek an intellectual engagement with 
their religion and those at ease with a more affective sense of identity and 
community.   Religious broadcasts, reaching as they do quite different audiences 
simultaneously are subject to varied consumptive challenges.  On the one hand, 
some Muslim interviewees take the view that the religious broadcasts tended to be 
superficial and to construct Islamic identity and community based on a “lowest-
common-denominator understanding” of the religion (Syed Mohd, 25).  For those 
(usually the younger and the more highly educated) who seek to intellectualise the 
religion, and to engage more analytically with their religion, the effect of the 
broadcasts is to encourage them to believe that an undesirably simplistic and largely 
emotional Islamic identity and community is being actively promulgated via 
religious broadcast.  They point to the construction of Islam as “the great religion” 
and “the superior Muslim community” as evidence of this approach: 
 
The broadcasts are emotionally charged. I think they try to get you to feel 
that Islam is the greatest. It’s everything. It’s the solution to man’s [sic] 
problems. They get you to feel, you talk about ideals, there is nothing critical 
said at all. There’s nothing wrong except that what you are presenting is very 
superficial, you see. Just make people feel good by being a Muslim but other 
than that, when you ask them, so what are the apparatus of governing the 
people that you have or when you introduce them to western ideas, they say 
this is disbelief.  It’s very bad (Syed Mohd, 25). 
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One explanation of this is offered by 23-year-old undergraduate Shawaliza, who 
believes that it is because “the religious orthodox themselves … don’t read a lot” and 
because their own education is “based on the Madina or the Al-Azhar system that 
tends towards the rhetorical while rejecting anything that comes from other than 
Muslims [as] kafir, deviant”.  A more extreme criticism suggests that such a 
constructed identity and community is intended by the religious orthodoxy as a 
deliberate strategy to keep adherents unquestioning and reliant:  
 
I would say that there’s some politics involved … sometimes you would 
rather the people remain where they are and be dependent on you for 
knowledge so that you won’t lose grip of them. This is what I see the 
religious orthodox in Southeast Asia to be like. They would prefer their 
followers to be in that position, you see, and let them be dependent on the 
leaders for knowledge. When the student becomes cleverer than the teacher 
then … the teacher is not the leader anymore … (Syed Mohd, 25). 
 
Thus, rather than unproblematically enabling and reinforcing a transnational 
identity and community, religious broadcasts may in fact be the vehicle which causes 
pan-Islamism to be challenged and fractured.  This analysis brings us in line with the 
literature that recognizes the agency of audiences, refuting the accord of absolute 
power to the mass media.  Indeed, as some interviewees pointed out, power most 
commonly lies with the individual, at least as conferred by the remote control device.   
This most literal and fundamental power is expressed by 23-year-old Salwati who 
talks about a tendency to switch channels when something religious comes on, thus 
denying any even the opportunity for meaning producers to reach out to their 
audiences.  Borhan (25, undergraduate) elaborates on the individual’s power of 
control, not only in terms of challenging the construction of a transnational Islamism 
or the hegemony of ‘nation’, but ever more fundamentally: 
 
The reality is, the technological tool that we have allows us to change 
channels. So sometimes I would just change channels. Because … I don’t 
know, it’s just already my kind of … part of my system already. Whenever 
there’s an azan on the Malaysian TV and all that, I would kind of like change 
the channel. I don’t know why. … It’s not dislike or disrespect or whatever.  
It’s because you have the means to shut out things. It’s like, I don’t feel like 
being part of a larger community of Islam, brothers or sisters with that azan.  
Unless you are in the mosque where you cannot shut things out, ah then 
there is a greater tendency to be part of the oneness there in the mosque.  In 
the space of the mosque.  But with tv, you can shut it out. 
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In short, the enabling function of technology – bringing religion to the living room – 
is matched by a disabling function – the ease with which it can be switched off.  The 
intended construction of either ‘nation’ or ‘transnation’ through the intersection of 
religious and technological practice is thus more fundamentally subverted. 
 
 While the consumption of religious broadcasts may entail the challenge of the 
global, transnational, pan-Islamic message, thus potentially reinforcing the more local 
interpretation of Islam as mediated by state hegemony, it may also enable 
transnational religious experience when audiences do tune in.  This is evident in at least 
three ways.  I illustrate through the example of the radio broadcast of the azan and 
televised broadcast of the haj.   
 
First, the use of the radio for the azan has added a new dimension to religious 
space that is predicated on the auditory.  The call to prayer through radio 
transmission creates a shared acoustic space among Muslims (Lee, 1999) that cuts 
across national boundaries, and is limited only by the reach of the radio broadcast.   
Those who respond to the azan then create their own place of prayer, whether at 
home or at the workplace or school.  The absence of formal shared physical space for 
worship defies notions of sacred place as a collectively shared physical space but 
calls attention to the sharing of a different kind of space – acoustic space – enabling a 
shared transnational religious experience.  However, it must be noted that, even 
while the call to prayer reaches out to a transnationsal community of listeners, it also 
simultaneously privatizes and individualizes.  As Lee (1999) argues, the community-
wide tradition is replaced by a decentralised, individualised personal, private act of 
worship.  This is made possible through the miniaturization of sound, as ear pieces 
and portable radios pervade (Chow, 1993).  Yet, at the same time, listening to the call 
to pray on the radio “reunites each member of the Islamic community and creates an 
abstract communal Islamic space without the encroachment of non-Islamic social 
spaces” (Lee, 1999:94).  This simultaneous individualizing and privatizing, on the 
one hand, and communing and membership, on the other, represent the 
quintessential experience of the modern urban condition, and parallel the 
simultaneous “localizing”, “nationalizing” and “transnationalizing” effects of 
technology on religious experience and understanding.    
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Second, the radio broadcast of the azan enables the inclusionary transnational 
gendered participation of women.  Lee (1999:95) argues that radio may be the main, 
if not the only, means for women to maintain their religious identity through the 
broadcast of the call to prayer.  Whereas they are not meant to go to mosque for 
prayers, radio nevertheless allows them to be a part of the receivers of the call, thus 
affirming their status and positioning them with men at least in this respect.  Lee’s 
argument is persuasive to the extent that women have access to sermons on 
television and radio, listen to religious talks, and listen to the call to prayer.  As 
Salwati articulated, “Because it is requested of Muslims to be silent and to listen to 
the azan being made, I am participating in a religious practice listening to the azan on 
tv or radio”.  The spaces of technology are in that sense emancipatory spaces for 
women in the participation in religious life, and connect them in a transnational 
manner with other Muslim men and women, locally, nationally and transnationally.   
 
 Third, audio-visual re-presentations succeed in recreating sacred experiences 
for some adherents, including transnational experiences.  This happens mainly for 
adherents who have had first hand prior experience of similar situations that they 
then view electronically.  This is best expressed by Sutinah (30-year-old nurse), who 
talks about her experience of the haj and the re-creation of the sacred experience as 
she watches a screening of the pilgrimage on television: 
 
Because I have been to Saudi Arabia, to Mecca, so I know the atmosphere 
there.  I can feel the emotions, the overwhelming feeling,  and the 
participation, maybe because I have experienced it.  I am able to feel the 
amazing atmosphere.  Yes, so because I have experienced the umrah before, 
and now I watch it on tv, I feel like I am a part of it. 
 
Similarly, Sahlan says: 
 
 I feel part of the Muslim brotherhood all over the world.  For example, when 
they broadcast the haj or umrah, I feel like I’m there because I had been there.  
I recollect the time I was there, how I felt, what I did, the feelings … 
 
On the rare occasion, there are those who are simply roused by what they see on 
television, and share some of the religious experience vicariously. 
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It does make me feel great being Muslim. You see how the effort of the 
Prophet has borne fruit now … just seeing the population inside the masjid in 
Mecca is itself impressive.  Inside the Masjid … when they show it, that one 
mosque can fill up to 2 million.  I also surprised myself with my reaction. 
When you watch TV, how can it be 2 million? 2 million in there?  The big 
mosque right? The Kaabah in the center. You can fill 2 million people in there. 
I don’t know. I’ve never been before. But my friend who experienced it says 
that at every angle, it’s around 400 metres. Yes, it’s very packed.  Sometimes 
you can’t even bow. It’s 2 million people (Syed Mohd, 25). 
 
In this regard, van de Burg’s (1995:48-49) notion of “living room pilgrims” offers a 
useful conceptual frame within which to think of this technology-enabled 
transnational experience.  She refers to such “living room pilgrims” as  
 
a heterogeneous group of individuals who, for the time they view televised 
assassination anniversary news narratives, join together in a common, albeit 
electronically mediated, pilgrimage journey.  And like corporeal pilgrims, 
living room pilgrims may experience “the communitas spirit” as they 
vicariously travel the pilgrimage route. 
 
While her reference point is televised assassination anniversary news narratives, the 
concept of a shared technology-mediated experience lends itself to useful analysis in 
a religious context.  Through watching a televised haj, the religious experience of 
awe, of the overwhelming and out-of-this world becomes a shared experience of the 
numinous (Otto, 1917) and constitute adherents’ participation in “living room 
rituals”. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, my aim was to focus on one particular technological 
development that has come to influence religious practice in significant ways – 
religious broadcasting.  While computer-mediated communications now garner 
growing research attention, I have chosen to remember the influence of the older 
technology of broadcasting, for its continued influence on myriad lives.  In bringing 
this focus to bear on another major phenomenon, that of transnationalism, I have 
come to understand how religious broadcasting does not contribute in a 
straightforward, linear fashion to perpetuating transnational identities and 
communities, but instead is implicated in the assertion of the national in the face of 
transnational influences, while simultaneously enabling and challenging the 
transnational.   
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The specific analysis of Singapore has shown how, through particular policy 
formulations on religion and broadcasting, the state-vaunted ‘nation’ is 
(re)produced.   This state construction of ‘nation’ is ridden with contradictions – 
secular yet multireligious; multireligious as characterised by equal absence rather 
than equal opportunity; and multireligious as equal treatment yet willing to privilege 
a minority group.  Through religious broadcasting policy and practice, the discursive 
field is circumscribed and the contradictions supported to enable the maintenance of 
the hegemonic ‘nation’.  Yet, this hegemony is not total, and the transnational 
periodically fills the breach.  While writings highlight ways in which social relations 
have altered with technological change, and scholars like Giddens (1990:21) have 
argued that modernity and its associated technologies has caused time to become 
separated from space and space from place, giving rise to ever more “disembedded 
social systems”, my analysis suggests that these assertions need to be tempered.  
Social relations and cultural systems have not invariably and unproblematically been 
lifted out of local contexts of interaction and restructured across “indefinite spans of 
time-space” (Giddens, 1990:21).  Instead, they continue to be rooted in local 
conditions.  In the present discussion, religious broadcasts purvey pan-Islamic 
messages, but also address social conditions in the context within which they are 
produced.  This underscores the embeddedness of religious understanding, the 
useful though partial value of the “transnational” in such understanding, the 
interlocking of the social and political with the religious, and the inappropriateness 
of treating “religion” as a priori category.  However, it must be emphasised that the 
“transnational” is not merely a heuristic in understanding religion in the 
contemporary world.  My analysis of audience experience of religious broadcasting 
illustrates how “techno-religious spaces” can be emancipatory in constructing shared 
transnational Islamic experiences, whether through acoustic space or living room 
rituals.   
 
In brief, technological developments (in this case, religious broadcasting) 
have influenced the ways in which religious experience and understanding have 
evolved in contemporary urban society.   These “techno-religious spaces” have 
enabled the national and transnational simultaneously, while creating conditions that 
at once challenge both.   
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